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Decoy state method quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the promising practical solutions to BB84
QKD with coherent light pulses. In the real world, however, statistical fluctuations with the finite code length
cannot be negligible, and the securities of theoretical and experimental researches of the decoy method state
QKD so far are based on the asymptotic GLLP’s formula which guarantees only that the limit of eavesdropper’s
information becomes zero as the code length approaches infinity. In this paper, we propose a substantially im-
proved decoy state QKD in the framework of the finite code length and derive the upper bound of eavesdropper’s
information in the finite code length decoy state QKD with arbitrary number of decoy states of different inten-
sities incorporating the finite statistics. We also show the performance of our decoy QKD and optimal values of
parameters by numerical simulation.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk,03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) was originally proposed
by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1] as a protocol, by which
two parties, Alice and Bob, share secret keys by using a quan-
tum communication channel as well as a public classical chan-
nel [2]. A remarkable feature is its unconditional security
[3, 4, 5]; it is guaranteed by the fundamental laws of quantum
mechanics and thereby QKD provides the unconditionally se-
cure communication system. This is a triumph of quantum
mechanics and quantum information science [6, 7] over the
conventional cryptographic systems. In the practical setting of
optical communication, however, it is the almost only option
to substitute qubits in the original BB84 QKD protocol with
heavily attenuated laser pulses because the perfect single pho-
ton emitting devices are not available in the current technol-
ogy. Such laser pulses - the phase randomized weak coherent
states - contains inevitably the multi-photon states at small but
finite probability, which gives a malicious eavesdropper (Eve)
a chance to obtain some amount of information on the shared
keys by a photon-number-splitting attack [8]. Gottesman-Lo-
Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) showed, however, that it is still
possible to obtain unconditionally secret key by BB84 proto-
col with such imperfect light sources, although the key gener-
ation rate and distances are very limited [9].
The recently proposed decoy state method [10, 11, 12, 13]
is one of the promising practical solutions to BB84 QKD with
coherent light pulses, in which several coherent state pulses
with different intensities are used. Such optical pulses with
different intensities have different photon number statistics.
This simple fact equips Alice and Bob with a countermeasure
against Eve. The original idea of the decoy state QKD is due
to Hwang [10]. So far, several experimental demonstrations
of decoy state QKD have been reported [14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
In most cases, the security analysis is based on the GLLP’s
asymptotic arguments, whereas, in the practical setting, the
code length is finite so that the asymptotic argument is no
longer valid and the unconditional security is actually not
guaranteed any more. The security analysis of QKD with
the finite code size must incorporate the statistical fluctua-
tions of the observed quantities [19]. Although several authors
[11, 13, 15, 20] have considered the influence of statistical
fluctuations on the decoy state QKD with finite code length,
what all of them have done is limited to the re-adjustment of
parameters of the asymptotic GLLP’s formula. Such an ad
hoc treatment cannot be justified to claim the unconditional
security because the asymptotic GLLP’s formula for the se-
cure key generation rate provides us little knowledge about
the eavesdropper’s information when the finite code length is
given. Therefore incorporating statistical fluctuations to the
parameters of the asymptotic GLLP’s formula cannot guar-
antee the security of the QKD protocols with the finite code
length even if values of these parameters are exactly known.
Suppose that the asymptotic rate of sacrifice bits needed for
the secure final private key is R. When the code length is n,
assigning nR to the number of sacrifice bits cannot ensure how
secure the final key is at all. Because the asymptotic argument
can only guarantee that the limit of eavesdropper’s informa-
tion becomes zero when the rate of sacrifice bits is greater
than R, and without the speed of the convergence the increas-
ing amount of sacrifice bits from nR, which is needed for the
secure key with the code length n, cannot be estimated. Thus
we must consider statistical fluctuations to eavesdropper’s in-
formation formula with the finite code length n. Several upper
bounds of eavesdropper’s information with n have been pro-
vided [3, 5, 21], and especially Hayashi’s formula is simple
and gives better key generation rate than the others, some pa-
rameters of which cannot be directly obtained from observed
quantities and are needed for estimation incorporating statis-
tical fluctuations.
In this paper, we propose a substantially improved de-
coy state QKD in the framework of finite code length [21]
by using the convex expansion formulas of weak coherent
states [11, 21] and derive an eavesdropper’s information for-
mula in the finite code length decoy state QKD with arbitrary
number of decoy states of different intensities incorporating
2the finite statistics. We also show the performance of our de-
coy QKD and optimal values of parameters by numerical sim-
ulation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II,
we begin by describing our decoy method QKD protocol.
In Section III, we show Eve’s information considering dark
counts. We next explain how to estimate Eve’s information in
Section IV and random variables for describing the system in
Section V, followed by the estimation incorporating statistical
fluctuations in Section VI. We then demonstrate our numer-
ical results of decoy method QKD protocol in Section VIII
and finally summarize our results and discuss future work in
section IX.
II. PROTOCOL
First of all, we describe our protocol [21]. We fix the size
N of our code, the number N′ of sent pulses, the maximum
number N and the minimum number N of the size of a final
key. We use k+1 different intensities or mean photon numbers
µ0 = 0 < µ1 < . . . < µk including vacuum (µ0) for the optical
pulses. Two conjugate bases (+ and ×) are treated separately
so that 2k+1 different pulses are involved in total. The vacuum
state (i = 0) is sent at the probability p0 and the µi pulse with ×
(+) basis is sent at the probability pi (pi+k) (i = 1, . . . , k). The
pulse with the intensity µi0 (µi0+k) (the signal pulse) is used
to distill a final secret key and the remainings (decoy pulses)
are used just for estimation of Eve’s attacks and/or the noise
characteristics of quantum channel.
Before running the protocol, the probability pD of dark
counts in the detector and the other (basis-dependent) system
error probability pS ( p˜S ) of the × (+) basis are measured in
advance. The probability pS or p˜S is the probability of errors
other than the transmission errors, that is, the error probabil-
ity for the noiseless channel. We assume that the detector is
a threshold detector and the efficiency of the detector is inde-
pendent of measurement bases [21].
The protocol is as follows. Alice randomly sends Bob a
sequence of optical pulses of k + 1 different intensities with
randomly chosen basis. After that, Bob performs a measure-
ment in one of the two bases and they compare bases and keep
the pulses with the common basis by communicating via pub-
lic channel. The number of sending pulses, received pulses,
and pulses of the common basis are denoted by, respectively,
Ai, Ci, and Ei (i = 0, . . . , 2k). Note that ∑2k+1i=0 Ai = N′. The
Ei bit string of ith kind of pulse contains error bits, which will
be detected by checking a portion of the bits (check bits). To
prepare check bits, they firstly perform the random permuta-
tion on Ei0 and Ei0+k bit strings by sharing common random
numbers via public channel. Then, for i = i0 and i = i0 + k,
the first N bit string is used as the raw key and the remaining
Ei0 − N and Ei0+k − N bit string are used as the check bits,
while the whole Ei bits are used as check bits for i , i0, i0 + k.
(If Ei0 ≤ N or Ei0+k ≤ N, then the protocol is aborted.) The
number of detected errors of ith kind of pulse is denoted by Hi
(i = 1, . . . , 2k). From these quantities, they can evaluate the
size of the final key guaranteeing the unconditional security.
If the evaluated final key size is not positive, the protocol is
aborted again. The size of final secret key of + basis is com-
puted as
N f inal := Nη
(
Hi0+k
Ei0+k − N
)
− m(Di,De), (1)
and that of × basis is
ˆN f inal := Nη
(
Hi0
Ei0 − N
)
− m˜( ˜Di,De), (2)
where η(·) denotes the error correcting coding rate and
m(Di,De) and m˜( ˜Di,De) represents the size of privacy am-
plification. Here we abbreviate the initial data (A, µ, pS , pD),
(A, µ, p˜S , pD) and the observed data (C,E,H) to Di, ˜Di, and
De, respectively, and A = (A1, . . . , A2k), etc. If N f inal < N
or ˆN f inal < N, they abort the protocol and go back to the
first step. Furthermore, if N < N f inal (N < ˆN f inal ), they
replace m(Di,De) [m˜( ˜Di,De)] by Nη(Hi0+k/(Ei0+k − N)) − N
[Nη(Hi0/(Ei0 − N)) − N]. Finally, they are left with N bits er-
ror correction followed by privacy amplification to share the
N f inal ( ˆN f inal) bit secret key of + (×) basis.
The error correction is performed as follows. Suppose that
Alice and Bob have, respectively, the random number se-
quences X and X′ of N bits, which contain some errors. The
task is to distill the common random number sequence of l+m
bits with negligible errors. In the forward error correction,
they share N × (l+m) binary matrix Me. Alice generates other
l+m bits random number Z, and sends a bit sequence MeZ+X
to Bob. Then, Bob applies the decoding of the code Me to the
bit sequence MeZ + X − X′ to extract Z. On the other hand, in
the reverse error correction, Bob generates the random num-
ber sequence Z of l + m bits, and sends MeZ + X′ to Alice.
Then, Alice applies the decoding code Me to the bit sequence
MeZ + X′ − X to extract Z. The error correction here corre-
sponds to a part of the twirling operation so that their channel
can be regarded as a Pauli channel from Alice (Bob) to Bob
(Alice) in the forward (reverse) error correction [21].
In the privacy amplification, Alice and Bob share the final
secret key of l bits from Z of l + m bits. More precisely, they
first generate the same l × (l + m) binary matrix Mp with
Prob{Z ∈ ImMTp } ≤ 2−m (3)
for any non-zero l + m bit sequence Z. Subsequently, they
generate the bit sequence MpZ of l bits from Z of l + m bits.
Combining the error correction and the privacy amplifica-
tion described above, the sequel of it is that Alice sends infor-
mation by the code ImMe/Me(KerMp).
III. GENERAL UPPER BOUND FOR EVE’S
INFORMATION ON FINAL KEY
In this section, we give an upper bound for the leakage in-
formation on the final key, which lays the foundation of the
security analysis in Sec. VI [21]. Here, we confine ourselves
3to the discussion on the final key with + basis. Eve’s at-
tack can be described by the conditional distribution P of the
Pauli action on the input state. Hence, the average of Eve’s
information with respect to the final key is closely related
to the error probability PPph,min,x|Mp,De,POS with the minimum
distance decoding when information is sent with × basis and
the code ImMe/Me(KerMp), where POS is a random variable
for the arrangement of different intensities and the position of
check bits, and x =→ (←) refers to the forward (reverse) er-
ror correction. The average IPE,av,x = E
P
Mp,De,POSI
P
E,x|Mp ,De,POS
of Eve’s information IPE,x|Mp ,De,POS is evaluated in terms of
PPph,av,x = E
P
Mp,De,POSP
P
ph,min,x|Mp,De,POS as
IPE,av,x ≤ PPph,av,x(1 + N − log PPph,av,x). (4)
Since the stochastic behavior of the random variables De de-
pends on the conditional distribution P, we denote the opera-
tion of taking the expectation with respect to Mp,De, POS by
E
P
Mp,De,POS. Denoting Eve’s state with respect to the final key
[Z] = MpZ by ρE,x[Z] , and its average state by ρE,x, we obtain
the following inequalities.
E
P
Mp,De,POS min[Z],[Z′] F(ρ
E,x
[Z] , ρ
E,x
[Z′]) ≥ 1 − 2PPph,av,x, (5)
E
P
Mp,De,POS max[Z],[Z′]
‖ρE,x[Z] − ρE,x[Z′]‖1 ≤ 4PPph,av,x, (6)
E
P
Mp,De,POS min[Z] F(ρ
E,x
[Z] , ρ
E,x) ≥ 1 − 2PPph,av,x, (7)
and
E
P
Mp,De,POS max[Z]
‖ρE,x[Z] − ρE,x‖1 ≤ 4PPph,av,x. (8)
Here, we have omitted the dependence of ρE,x[Z] on Mp, De, and
POS. Next, let PP
succ,x|Mp be the probability that Eve acquires
perfectly information on the final key when she performs the
optimal measurement after the privacy amplification. Then,
E
P
Mp,De,POSP
P
succ,x|Mp
≤
(√
PPph,av,x
√
1 − 2−N +
√
1 − PPph,av,x
√
2−N
)2 (9)
Here, we have again omitted the dependence of PP
succ,x|Mp on
Mp, De, and POS. Now, it is evident that the evaluation of
PPph,av,x plays an essential role in the security analysis.
We start by grouping detected pulses into six parts accord-
ing to which state (vacuum, single photon, or multi-photon) is
actually sent by Alice and whether or not the detection is nor-
mal, i.e., it is not due to the dark counts. We define Ji (J3+i) as
the number of pulses detected normally (by dark counts) un-
der the condition that the state sent is vacuum (i = 0), single
photon (i = 1), or multi-photon (i = 2) states. For example, J3
represents the number of pulses detected by dark counts when
the state sent by Alice is the vacuum. We regard the simul-
taneous event of a dark count and a normal count as a dark
count. This is because the collision of both photons causes
the information loss of the normal count. Let t be the num-
ber of pulses or bits with transmission (phase) error in × basis
among J1 bits. This is also a random variable. Then, by de-
noting the expectation with respect to the random variables t
and J = (J0, . . . , J5) by EPt,J, PPph,av,x can be evaluated as
PPph,av,→ ≤EPt,J,De,POS2
−
[
m(Di ,De)−J1h(t/J1)−J2−J4−J5
]
+
=EPt,J,De,POS2
−
[
m(Di ,De)−N+J1(1−h(t/J1))+J0+J3
]
+ , (10)
and
PPph,av,← ≤EPt,J,De,POS2
−
[
m(Di ,De)−J1h(t/J1)−J0−J2
]
+
=EPt,J,De,POS2
−
[
m(Di ,De)−N+J1(1−h(t/J1))+J3+J4+J5
]
+ , (11)
where [z]+ = max{0, z} and h(x) is defined by
h(x) :=
{ −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) if x ∈ [0, 1/2]
1 if x ∈ (1/2, 1].
(12)
In the actual system, the random variables t and J cannot be
identified exactly. They are estimated from the measured val-
ues De, by which the size of sacrifice bits m(Di,De) is de-
termined. It is of crucial importance to determine m(Di,De)
such that the average error probability PPph,av,x is less than
a given value for any attack P. The statistical fluctuation
of De is properly taken into account in the computation of
m(Di,De). As for the attack P, it is sufficient to treat the
extremal points, in which these random variables can be de-
scribed by the combination of multi-hypergeometric distribu-
tions. All random variables concern our problem are listed in
Sec. V.
IV. EVE’S STRATEGY AND ITS ESTIMATION
Suppose that Eve can distinguish the different number
states. A naı¨ve way to describe Eve’s attacks is to associate
each number state with the corresponding parameters describ-
ing Eve’s attacks. This is, however, a formidable task because
the infinite number of unknown parameters are involved. In
order to avoid such a difficulty, one of the authors [22] intro-
duced a convex expansion of the phase-randomized coherent
state
∑∞
n=0 e
−µµn|n〉〈n|/n! in terms of vacuum, single-photon,
and multi-photon states. Here, we define the multi-photon
states σl (l = 2, . . . , k + 1) as
σl :=
1
Ωl
∞∑
n=l
γl,n
n!
|n〉〈n|, (13)
where
Ωl :=
∞∑
n=l
γl,n
n!
, (14)
and
γl,n :=
l−1∑
j=1
µn−2j∏l−1
t=1,t, j(µ j − µt)
, (15)
4with µ1 < µ2 < · · · < µk. Note that σl [Eq. (13)] are bona fide
states, i.e., σl ≥ 0 and Trσl = 1. It is easy to see that the state∑∞
n=0 e
−µµn|n〉〈n|/n! can be expressed as a convex combination
of |0〉 〈0|, |1〉 〈1|, and σl;
e−µi
∞∑
n=0
µni
n!
|n〉〈n|
= e−µi
|0〉〈0| + µi|1〉〈1| +
i+1∑
n=2
µ2i
n−2∏
t=1
(µi − µt)Ωnσn
 .(16)
Here, coefficients
e−µiµ2i
n−2∏
t=1
(µi − µt)Ωn
are positive.
Now, we adopt the worst case scenario on Eve’s attacks.
Namely, we assume that Eve can distinguish vacuum state
(ρ0 = |0〉 〈0|), single photon state (ρ1 = |1〉 〈1|), multi-photon
states with × basis ρ j = σ j ( j = 2, . . . , k + 1) and those
with + basis ρk+ j = σ j ( j = k + 2, . . . , 2k + 1). The num-
ber of emitted jth state ρ j ( j = 0, . . . , 2k + 1) is denoted by
B j; B = (B j). According to the values of B, Eve can do the
following attacks; Eve tricks Bob into detecting jth state with
ratio q j(B) [23] and causes phase errors with ratio r j(B) for
jth state ( j = 1, 2, . . . , k + 1) and bit errors with ratio r˜ j(B) for
jth state ( j = 1, k + 2, . . . , 2k + 1). The quantities r j(B) and
r˜ j(B) describe the transmission errors. In the following, we
focus on the final secret key of × basis and write q j and r j (r˜ j)
instead of q j(B) and r j(B) [r˜ j(B)]. Note that q j is the rate of
detection with the exclusion of dark counts. Since the state ρ j
with the × basis is, in general, different from that with the +
basis, the parameters q j do not necessarily coincide with q j+k
( j = 1, . . . , k). The generating probability of each state can be
described by the matrix (P jk:i)i=0,...,2k, j=0,...,2k+1 defined by
Pk :=

1 0 0 0
Y Z X 0
Y Z 0 X
 (17)
where Y and Z are k-dimensional vectors such that Yi = e−µi
and Zi = µie−µi and the k × k matrix X is given by
X ji :=
{
µ2i
∏ j−1
t=1 (µi − µt)e−µiΩ j+1 j = 1, . . . , i
0 j = i + 1, . . . , k, (18)
for i = 1, . . . , k. For example, the matrix Pk for k = 3 is given
by
P3 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
e−µ1 µ1e−µ1 e−µ1µ21Ω2 0 0 0 0 0
e−µ2 µ2e−µ2 e−µ2µ22Ω2 e
−µ2µ22(µ2 − µ1)Ω3 0 0 0 0
e−µ3 µ3e−µ3 e−µ3µ23Ω2 e
−µ3µ23(µ3 − µ1)Ω3 ∗ 0 0 0
e−µ1 µ1e−µ1 0 0 0 e−µ1µ21Ω2 0 0
e−µ2 µ2e−µ2 0 0 0 e−µ2µ22Ω2 e
−µ2µ22(µ2 − µ1)Ω3 0
e−µ3 µ3e−µ3 0 0 0 e−µ3µ23Ω2 e−µ3µ23(µ3 − µ1)Ω3 ∗

, (19)
∗ = e−µ3 (µ3 − µ1)(µ3 − µ2)Ω4.
Now, the expectation of the detection probability pi = Ci/Ai
is expressed as
E(pi) = Ξ(1)i (q) :=
2k+1∑
j=0
P ji q
j + pD, (20)
for i = 0, . . . , 2k and the expectation of detected error proba-
bility is written as
E(si pi) = Ξ(2)i (q, r) := P1i q1r1
′
+
k+1∑
j=2
P ji q
jr j +
1
2
(P0i q0 + pD),
(21)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, where si = Hi/Ei (i , i0) and si0 =
Hi0/(Ei0 −N). In Eq. (21), r1′ = (1− pS )r1 + pS (1− r1). Since
we cannot uniquely determine the parameters q j and r j from
Eqs. (20) and (21) even when E(pi) = pi and E(si pi) = si pi,
we fix q
k+1+q2k+1√
2
and rk+1 as x ∈ [0,
√
2(1 − pD)] and y ∈ [0, 1]
to obtain
qˆ jx =

p0 − pD j = 0
ξ j j = 1, . . . , k, k + 2, . . . , 2k
1√
2
(
x + ξk+1
)
j = k + 1
1√
2
(
x − ξk+1
)
j = 2k + 1,
(22)
and
rˆ
j
x,y =

1
1−2pS
(
ζ1 − pS
)
j = 1
ζ j j = 2, . . . , k
y j = k + 1,
(23)
with
ζ j :=
1
qˆ jx
k∑
i=1
(P−1k×k)ij
×
{
si pi −
1
2
[P0i (p0 − pD) + pD] − Pk+1i qˆk+1x y
}
,(24)
5where Xl×l presents the l × l submatrix (Xi, j)1≤i, j≤l for a given
rectangular matrix X = (Xi, j)0≤i≤a,0≤ j≤b, and ξ j ( j = 1, . . . , 2k)
in Eq. (22) is defined as
ξ j :=
2k∑
i=1
(P−12k×2k)ij
[
pi − pD − P0i (p0 − pD) − xP
2k+1
i
]
, (25)
where
P
j
i :=
2k+1∑
j′=0
P j
′
i Q j
′ , j, (26)
with
Q j′, j :=

− 1√
2
j′ = k + 1, j = 2k + 1
1√
2
j′ = 2k + 1, j = 2k + 1
1√
2
j′ = 2k + 1 or k + 1, j = k + 1
δ j
′, j Otherwise.
(27)
When the true values q j and r j are close to zero, say, the
linear estimators given above often take on negative values
due to statistical fluctuations. The maximal likelihood estima-
tion provides an alternate solution free from such a drawback,
which is given by
(
qML
x,y,(B ji )
, rML
x,y,(B ji )
)
= argmax
q,r:qk+1+q2k+1=
√
2x,rk+1=y

2k∑
i=0
[
Ci logΞ(1)i (q) + (Ai −Ci) log(1 − Ξ(1)i (q))
]
+
k∑
i=1
Hi log
Ξ
(2)
i (q, r)
Ξ
(1)
i (q)
+
k∑
i=1
(Ei − δi,i0 N − Hi) log
1 − Ξ
(2)
i (q, r)
Ξ
(1)
i (q)

 , (28)
with 0 ≤ q j ≤ 1 − pD and 0 ≤ r j ≤ 1. If the above linear
estimators Eqs. (22) and (23) are in the range 0 ≤ qˆ jx ≤ 1− pD
and 0 ≤ rˆ jx,y ≤ 1, then they coincide with the corresponding
maximum likelihood estimators.
V. RANDOM VARIABLES DESCRIBING THE SYSTEM
To compute the size of final secret key with the finite statis-
tics due to the finite code length, several stochastic variables
must be incorporated properly. In this section, we describe
random variables with their means and (co)variances, which
are used in the computation of the sacrifice key size (Sec. VII).
Firstly, we define B ji as the number of the emitted state
ρ j given that the ith kind of pulse is sent (i = 0, . . . , 2k;
j = 0, . . . , 2k + 1). They obey the following multi-nomial
distribution.
P(B0i , . . . , B2k+1i ) = (P0i )B
0
i · · · (P2k+1i )B
2k+1
i
Ai!
B0i ! · · · B2k+1i !
. (29)
Note that Ai =
∑2k+1
j=0 B
j
i and B
j =
∑2k
i=0 B
j
i . The mean of B
j
i is
P ji Ai.
Next, we define C ji as the number of ithe kind of pulse de-
tected normally under the condition that the emitted states is
ρ j (i = 0, . . . , 2k; j = 0, . . . , 2k + 1). Note that the dark counts
are not included in the detection events. The contribution of
dark counts is expressed as C−1i ( j = −1). These stochastic
variables obey
P(C j0,C j1, . . . ,C j2k) =
(B j0
C j0
)(B j1
C j1
)
· · ·
(B j2k
C j2k
)
( ∑2k
i=0 B
j
i
q j
∑2k
i=0 B
j
i
) , (30)
for j , −1 and
P(C−1i ) = p
C−1i
D (1 − pD)Ai−C
−1
i
(
Ai
C−1i
)
. (31)
Note that
∑2k
i=0 C
j
i = q
j ∑2k
i=0 B
j
i and Ci =
∑2k+1
j=−1 C
j
i . The means
EC ji are given by q
jB ji for j , −1 and pDAi for j = −1. Devi-
ations ∆′C ji = C
j
i − EC
j
i satisfy
E∆′C ji∆
′C ji′ = q
j(1 − q j)
δi,i′B ji − B
j
i B
j
i′∑2k
i=0 B
j
i

 q j(1 − q j)
δi,i′P ji Ai − P
j
i AiP
j
i′Ai′∑2k
i=0 P
j
i Ai
 , (32)
for j , −1 and
E(∆′C−1i )2 = pD(1 − pD)Ai. (33)
Other covariances are zero.
Since Bob measures the received pulses with randomly cho-
sen basis, the measuring basis coincides with the basis of ρ j
6with probability 1/2 [24]. Therefore, defining the numbers of
common basis pulses among C ji by E
j
i =
1
2C
j
i + ∆
′E ji , they
obey the following binomial distribution
P(E ji ) =
(
1
2
)C ji (C ji
E ji
)
, (34)
for i = 0, 1, . . . , 2k and j = −1, . . . , 2k + 1, and the nonzero
covariances of ∆′E ji are computed as
E(∆′E ji )2 =
1
k + 1C
j
i 
q jP ji Ai
k + 1 , (35)
for j , −1 and
E(∆′E−1i )2 =
1
k + 1C
−1
i 
pDAi
k + 1 . (36)
Now we define the following quantities F ji ; F
j
i0 (F
j
i0+k) de-
notes the number of check bits with × (+) basis within Ei0 −N
(N) bits given that the emitted state is ρ j and F ji = E ji for
i = 1, . . . , k, i , i0. For i = i0 and i = i0 + k, their distributions
are, respectively, given by the following multi-hypergeometric
distributions ( j = −1, 0, 1, . . . , 2k + 1).
P(F−1i0 , F0i0 , F1i0 , F2i0 , . . . , Fk+1i0 )
=
(E−1i0
F−1i0
)(E0i0
F0i0
)(E1i0
F1i0
)(E2i0
F2i0
)
· · ·
(Ek+1i0
Fk+1i0
)
( Ei0
Ei0−N
) , (37)
and
P(F−1i0+k, F0i0+k, F1i0+k, Fk+2i0+k, . . . , F2k+1i0+k )
=
(E−1i0+k
F−1i0+k
)(E0i0+k
F0i0+k
)(E1i0+k
F1i0+k
)(Ek+2i0+k
Fk+2i0+k
)
· · ·
(E2k+1i0+k
F2k+1i0+k
)
(Ei0+k
N
) , (38)
where Ei =
∑2k+1
j=−1 E
j
i ,
∑2k+1
j=−1 F
j
i0 = Ei0 − N,
∑2k+1
j=−1 F
j
i0+k = N.
Note that Ek+2i0 = · · · = E2k+1i0 = E2i0+k = · · · = Ek+1i0+k = 0. It is
easy to see that
EF ji0 =
Ei0 − N
Ei0
E ji0 , (39)
and
EF ji0+k =
N
Ei0+k
E ji0+k, (40)
for j = −1, . . . , 2k + 1. The nonzero covariances of deviation
∆′F ji are computed as
E∆′F ji∆
′F j
′
i =
E ji
Ei
(
1 − N
Ei
) δ j, j′ − NE
j′
i
Ei
 , (41)
for i = i0 ( j = −1, 0, 1, 2, . . . , k + 1) and i = i0 + k ( j =
−1, 0, 1, k + 2, . . . , 2k + 1).
The errors occur among F ji check bits in × basis with prob-
ability r j ( j = 1, . . . , k + 1). We define G ji as the num-
ber of pulses with transmission errors in × basis among F ji
pulses; G ji = r
jF ji + ∆
′G ji , which obey the following multi-
hypergeometric distribution
P(G j1, . . . ,G jk,G ji0+k)
=
(F j1
G j1
)
· · ·
(F jk
G jk
)(F ji0+k
G ji0+k
)( ∑2k
i′=0 C
j
i′−
∑2k
i′=1 F
j
i′
r j
∑2k
i′=0 C
j
i′−
∑2k
i′=1 G
j
i′
)
( ∑2k
i′=0 C
j
i′
r j
∑2k
i′=1 C
j
i′
) , (42)
for i = 1, . . . , k, i0 + k and j = 1, 2, . . . , k+ 1. Note that G ji = 0
for i ≥ k+1 and i , i0+k and that the system errors other than
the transmission errors are not counted in the definition of G ji .
The nonzero covariances of deviations ∆′G ji are computed as
E∆′G ji∆
′G ji′ = r
j(1 − r j)
δi,i′F ji −
F ji F
j
i′∑2k
i=0 C
j
i
 . (43)
The number of detected errors in × basis Hi is the sum of
several contributions. The contribution of dark counts (vac-
uum state) is denoted by H−1i (H0i ), which is the number of
detected errors of ρ−1 (ρ0) among F−1i (F0i ) bits. Since the bits
received by Bob are completely independent of the bits sent
by Alice for j = −1 and 0, the error probability is 1/2 so that
the probability distributions of random the random variables
H−1i and H0i are, respectively, given by
P(H−1i ) =
(
1
2
)F−1i (F−1i
H−1i
)
, (44)
and
P(H0i ) =
(
1
2
)F0i (F0i
H0i
)
. (45)
For the single photon state, the errors occurred within G1i bits
are recovered accidentally by the system errors other than
transmission errors with probability pS and that the errors oc-
curred within F1i − G1i by the same cause contribute to the
detected errors with probability pS . Therefore, the detected
errors of the single photon state are divided into two; H1i and
H1i
′
, whose probability distributions are, respectively, given
by
P(H1i ) = (1 − pS )H
1
i pG
1
i −H1i
S
(G1i
H1i
)
, (46)
and
P(H1i
′) = pH1i
′
S (1 − pS )F
1
i −G1i −H1i
′
(F1i −G1i
H1i
′
)
. (47)
7The random variable Hi is then written as
Hi = H−1i + H
0
i + H
1
i + H
1′
i +
k+1∑
j=2
G ji
=
1
2
(F−1i + F0i ) + (1 − pS )G1i + pS (F1i −G1i )
+
k+1∑
j=2
G ji + ∆
′Hi, (48)
where∆′Hi is the deviation whose nonzero variances are given
by
E(∆′Hi)2 = 1k + 1 (F
−1
i + F
0
i ) + pS (1 − pS )F1i . (49)
The numbers known by Alice and Bob are Ci =
∑2k+1
j=−1 C
j
i ,
Ei =
∑2k+1
j=−1 E
j
i for i = 0, 1, . . . , 2k, and Hi for i = 1, . . . , k.
VI. COMPUTATION OF SACRIFICE KEY SIZE
(REVERSE CASE)
In this section, we give a method to derive the size of sac-
rifice key of + basis in case of reverse error correction. Ac-
cording to the central limit theorem with respect to the multi-
nomial and multi-hypergeometric distributions, we can as-
sume safely that all random variables given in Sec. V obey
normal distributions with the averages and the (co)variances
given in Sec. V because the number of our samples is suffi-
ciently large.
In the following argument, stochastic variables B ji are fixed.
For now, we fix also x = q
k+1(B)+q2k+1(B)√
2
and y = rk+1(B). Ap-
plying the inequality (11), the quantity PPph,av,← is bounded
from above by the expectation of
2
−
m(Di ,De)−N+F1i0+k
1−h
G
1
i0+k
F1i0+k

+F−1i0+k

+ .
Here, J1 and t in (11) are, respectively, given by F1i0+k and
G1i0+k. The number of pulses detected by dark counts J
3+ J4+
J5 in (11) is simply expressed as F−1i0+k. Now, we introduce a
new function ha(x) which is a slight modification of h(x):
ha(x) =

h(x) if x ≥ a,
h(a) + h′(a)(x − a) if x < a. (50)
Owing to the convexity of h(x), we have h(x) ≤ ha(x) to obtain
2
−
m(Di ,De)−N+F1i0+k
1−h
G
1
i0+k
F1i0+k

+F−1i0+k

+
≤ 2
−
m(Di ,De)−N+F1i0+k
1−ha
G
1
i0+k
F1i0+k

+F−1i0+k

+ , (51)
which is used for an upper bound of the quantity PPph,av,←.
Here, we estimate
Θ(Di,De) := N − F1i0+k
1 − ha
G
1
i0+k
F1i0+k

 − F−1i0+k, (52)
by the estimator [25]
ˆΘx,y(Di,De) := N −
NAi0+k
Ci0+k
{
qˆ1xP
1
i0+k
[
1 − ha(rˆ1x,y)
]
+ pD
}
.
(53)
The deviation Θ(Di,De) − ˆΘx,y(Di,De) is divided into two
stochastic variables, ∆Θ1 and ∆Θ2;
Θ(Di,De) − ˆΘx,y(Di,De) = ∆Θ1 + ∆Θ2, (54)
where
∆Θ1 := −F1i0+k
1 − ha
G
1
i0+k
F1i0+k

 − F−1i0+k
+
N
{
qˆ1xB1i0+k
[
1 − ha(rˆ1x,y)
]
+ Ai0+k pD
}
Ci0+k
, (55)
and
∆Θ2 :=
Nqˆ1x(Ai0+kP1i0+k − B1i0+k)
[
1 − ha(rˆ1x,y)
]
Ci0+k
. (56)
Now, let us apply the Gaussian approximation to the vari-
ables ∆Θ1 and ∆Θ2. Since the mean of ∆Θ1 is zero,√
vi0;x,y (q, r, B ji ,A, µ)Φ−1(2−δ1 ) ≥ ∆Θ1, (57)
with probability ≥ 1 − 2−δ1 . Here, vi0;x,y (q, r, B ji ,A, µ) denotes
the variance of ∆Θ1, and
Φ(x) = 1√
2π
∫ −x
−∞
e−
y2
2 dy (58)
is the probabilistic distribution of the standard normal distri-
bution. In Eq. (56), Ai0+kP1i0+k − B1i0+k is a stochastic variable
with the mean zero and the variance Ai0+kP1i0+k(1 − P1i0+k). It
follows that
Nqˆ1x
[
1 − ha(rˆ1x,y)
]
Ci0+k
√
Ai0+kP1i0+k(1 − P1i0+k)Φ
−1(2−δ2) ≥ ∆Θ2,
(59)
with probability ≥ 1 − 2−δ2 . Consequently, taking the size of
privacy amplification m(Di,De) in (11) as
m(Di,De) = ˆΘx,y(Di,De) +
√
vi0;x,y (q, r, B ji ,A, µ)Φ−1(2−δ1)
+
Nqˆ1x
[
1 − ha(rˆ1x,y)
]
Ci0+k
√
Ai0+kP1i0+k(1 − P1i0+k)Φ
−1(2−δ2)
+δ3, (60)
we have
PPph,av,← ≤ 2−δ1 + 2−δ2 + 2−δ3 . (61)
The quantity m(Di,De) [Eq. (60)] depends on q, r, and B ji ,
which can be approximated by qML
x,y,(B ji )
, rML
x,y,(B ji )
, and AiP ji , re-
spectively so that m(Di,De) can be written in terms of ob-
served quantities. From above observation, we define the size
8of privacy amplification for fixed x and y as
mi0;x,y(Di,De)
:= ˆΘx,y(Di,De)
+
√
vi0;x,y (qMLx,y,(AiP ji ), r
ML
x,y,(AiP ji )
, AiP ji ,A, µ)Φ−1(2−δ1)
+
Nqˆ1x
[
1 − ha(rˆ1x,y)
]
Ci0+k
√
Ai0+kP1i0+k(1 − P1i0+k)Φ
−1(2−δ2)
+δ3, (62)
which satisfies
mi0;x,y(Di,De) ≥ Θ(Di,De) + δ3 (63)
with probability 1 − 2−δ1 − 2−δ2 . It should be noted that the
linear estimators qˆ1x and rˆ1x,y are used in the first term of the
right-hand side of Eq. (62), while the maximally likelihood
estimators are used in the second and third terms. This is be-
cause if linear estimators were used in the second and third
terms in the right-hand side of Eq. (62), these terms would
not well-defined since the linear estimators do not necessarily
satisfy 0 ≤ qˆ jx ≤ 1 − pD and 0 ≤ rˆ jx,y ≤ 1.
Now, we take the worst case and define the size of privacy
amplification mi0 (Di,De) as
mi0 (Di,De) := max
0≤x≤
√
2(1−pD),0≤y≤1
mi0;x,y(Di,De), (64)
then (61) holds for arbitrary x and y [26].
The size of privacy amplification for × basis is given by
mi0 ( ˜A, µ, p˜S , pD; ˜C, ˜E, ˜H) where ˜A0 = A0, ˜Ai = Ai+k, ˜Ai+k =
Ai, ˜C0 = C0, ˜Ci = Ci+k, ˜Ci+k = Ci, ˜E0 = E0, ˜Ei = Ei+k,
˜Ei+k = Ei, ˜Hi = Hi+k, and ˜Hi+k = Hi for i = 1, . . . , k.
In the course of actual numerical computations, it often
happens that x or y moves away from its defining region. To
circumvent this difficulty, we use ha(z) instead of h(z), which
enables us to extend the accessible region of z to (−∞,∞) and
further to avoid the divergence of the derivative of h. When
a is small enough, vi0;x,y (q, r, B ji ,A, µ) takes on a large value,
while a is large, ˆΘx,y(Di,De) takes on a large value in turn.
The parameter a must be properly chosen taking into account
such a trade-off behavior. The detail is shown in Appendix A.
Now, let us go back to Eq. (4). To ensure
IPE,av,← ≤ 2−δ, (65)
it is sufficient to choose δ1 = δ+δ′+1 and δ2 = δ3 = δ+δ′+2.
Here, δ′ is
⌈
log2 N
⌉
. Since δ + δ′ ≪ N, δ + δ′ + 1 + N . 2δ′ .
Thus,
IPE,av,← ≤ PPph,av,←(1 + N − log PPph,av,←)
≤ 2−δ−δ′ (1 + N + δ + δ′)
≤ 2−δ−δ′ · 2δ′ = 2−δ. (66)
In parallel with the above argument based on the Gaussian
approximation, the large deviation type evaluation is also pos-
sible. By Crame´r’s theorem [27], Prob{|X − E(X)| > cN} goes
to zero exponentially when X obeys the N trials of a multino-
mial distribution or a multinomial hypergeometric distribution
for an arbitrary constant c > 0. Hence, the probability satisfy-
ing the inequalities
∆Θ2 < c1N, (67)
∆F1i0+k = F
1
i0+k − E(F1i0+k) < c2N, ∆G1i0+k = G1i0+k − E(G1i0+k) <
c3N, and ∆F−1i0+k = F
−1
i0+k − E(F−1i0+k) < c4N goes to zero ex-
ponentially for arbitrary constants c1, c2, c3, c4 > 0. For an
arbitrary constant c5 > 0, we choose c2, c3, c4 > 0 such that if
∆F1i0+k < Nc2, ∆G
1
i0+k < Nc3,∆, and ∆F
−1
i0+k < Nc4, then
∆Θ1 < c5N (68)
is always satisfied. Thus, the probability satisfying (68) goes
to zero exponentially. Now, we denote the exponential upper
bounds of (67) and (68) by 2−d1N and 2−d2N , respectively, and
choose the size of sacrifice bits mi0:x,y(Di,De) as EΘ + (c1 +
c5+c6)N for a constant c6 > 0. Then, applying (11), we obtain
an exponential upper bound:
PPph,av,← ≤ 2−d1N + 2−d2N + 2−c6N . (69)
However, as is known in mathematical statistics, the above
exponential evaluation does not yield a tighter upper bound of
Prob{|X − E(X)| > cN} as the Gaussian approximation does.
Hence, in the finite-length code, the Gaussian approximation
gives a tighter upper bound of PPph,av,← than the above expo-
nential upper bound. This is the reason why we have em-
ployed the Gaussian approximation.
VII. COMPUTATION OF vi0;x,y (q, r, B ji ,A, µ)
The variance vi0;x,y (q, r, B ji ,A, µ) for a given stochastic vari-
able B ji and under constraints
qk+1+q2k+1√
2
= x and rk+1 = y is
given by
vi0;x,y (q, r, B ji ,A, µ) = E∆Θ21, (70)
where
∆Θ1
 −
[
1 − ha(r1)
]
∆F1i0+k + h
′
a(r1)∆′G1i0+k − ∆F−1i0+k
−
N
{
q1B1i0+k
[
1 − ha(r1)
]
+ Ai0+k pD
}
(ECi0+k)2
∆Ci0+k
+
NB1i0+k
[
1 − ha(r1)
]
ECi0+k
∆qˆ1x −
N
ECi0+k
q1B1i0+kh
′
a(r1)∆rˆ1x,y,
(71)
with ∆X = X − EX in the right-hand side of Eq. (71). Here,
stochastic variables, ∆F1i0+k, ∆F
−1
i0+k, ∆qˆ
1
x, and ∆rˆ1x,y are com-
puted as
∆F ji0+k 
2N
ECi0+k
∆E ji0+k −
2Nq jB ji0+k
(ECi0+k)2
2k+1∑
j′=−1
∆E j
′
i0+k
+∆′F ji0+k, (72)
9∆qˆ1x =
2k∑
i=1
(P−12k×2k)i1
(
∆Ci
Ai
− P0i
∆C0
Ai
)
, (73) and
∆rˆ1x,y  −
1
(1 − 2pS )(qˆ1x)2
k∑
i=1
(P−1k×k)i1
{
E(si pi) − 12
[
P0i
(
EC0
A0
− pD
)
+ pD
]
− Pk+1i qk+1y
}
∆qˆ1x
+
1
(1 − 2pS )qˆ1x
k∑
i=1
(P−1k×k)i1
(
∆(si pi) − 12 P
0
i
∆C0
A0
− Pk+1i y∆qˆk+1x
)
. (74)
In Eq. (74), ∆qˆk+1x and ∆(si pi) are given by
∆qˆk+1x =
1√
2
2k∑
i=1
(P−12k×2k)ik+1
(
∆Ci
Ai
− P0i
∆C0
Ai
)
, (75)
∆(si pi)  2Ai∆Hi −
2EHi
AiEEi
∆′Ei, (76)
for i = 1, . . . , k; i , i0 and
∆(si0 pi0 ) 
ECi0
Ai0 (EEi0 − N)
∆Hi0 −
ECi0EHi0
Ai0 (EEi0 − N)2
∆′Ei0
− NEHi0
Ai0 (EEi0 − N)2
∆Ci0 . (77)
Deviations ∆Hi in Eqs. (76) and (77) are computed as
∆Hi =
k+1∑
j=−1
r˜ j
2
∆C ji +
k+1∑
j=−1
r˜ j∆′E ji + (1 − 2pS )∆′G1i
+
k+1∑
j=2
∆′G ji + ∆
′Hi, (78)
for i = 1, . . . , k; i , i0. and
∆Hi0 =
k+1∑
j=−1
r˜ j
[(
1 − 2N
ECi0
)
∆E ji0
+
2NEC ji0
(ECi0 )2
2k+1∑
j′=−1
∆E j
′
i0 + ∆
′F ji0

+(1 − 2pS )∆′G1i0 +
k+1∑
j=2
∆′G ji0 + ∆
′Hi0 , (79)
where r˜−1 = r˜0 = 12 , r˜
1 = r1 + (1 − 2r1)pS , and r˜ j = r j for
j ≥ 2. Note that ∆E ji = 12∆
′C ji + ∆
′ E ji in Eqs. (72) and (79).
Equation (70) with subsequent equations in this section and
(co)variances given in Sec. V yields the explicit form of vi0;x,y .
If q and r coincide with the respective values estimated
from the observed quantities De = (C,E,H), ECi, EEi0 , and
EHi in Eqs. (71), (72), (76), and (77) are, respectively, equal
to the observed quantities, Ci, Ei0 , and Hi.
TABLE I: Parameters for numerical simulation.
a1 (db/km) a0 (db) ηdet
0.17 5.0 0.1
pD pS , p˜S p0
4.0 × 10−7 3% 4.0 × 10−7
VIII. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
In this section we show the results of numerical simulation
to reveal performances of our protocol and to know the op-
timal values of parameters such as intensities in our protocol.
For numerical simulation, we use k+1 = 4 different intensities
including vacuum because k = 3 is required for at least good
estimation of the probability that multi-photon is actually sent
by Alice [22].
A. Parameters
Let a1 (db/km) be the fiber loss, a0 (db) be the receiver
loss, ηdet be the efficiency of the detector, and L (km) be the
transmission distance. A detection probability p of the pulse
µi can be represented by
p = 1 − e−αµi + p0, (80)
where
α = ηdet · 10−
a1L+a0
10 . (81)
Listed in Table I are parameters used for our numerical sim-
ulation, all of which are experimental values in the long dis-
tance experiment [28], and a1 is the lowest loss value in com-
mercially available optical fibers [29]. We assume that the
detection probability p0 of vacuum state equals to dark count
rate pD. In this setting, the detection probability of the pulse
µ = 0.5 at L = 20.0(100.0) (km) is 7.2× 10−3(3.2× 10−3) and
the error probability is 3.00%(3.06%), respectively.
We also fix the security parameter δ in order to satisfy the
average of Eve’s information IPE,av,← ≤ 2−9 in Eq. (65). It
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FIG. 1: Coding rates of the LDPC codes used for numerical simula-
tion.
is sufficient to set δ1 = δ3 = 9 + [log2(N)] + 2, and δ2 =
9 + [log2(N)] + 1.
For the error correction with the finite code length, we use
the LDPC (Low Density Parity Check) code [30, 31] which
is known to be one of the best classical error correcting codes
and the performance can asymptotically achieve the Shannon
limit. Figure 1 shows coding rates of our LDPC codes. The
coding rate with N = 1.0 × 106 is about 0.75 when the error
probability is 3%.
Suppose that intensities µi and sending probabilities p˜i take
discrete values 0.05, 0.10, . . . , 1.00 for our numerical simula-
tion because computation of mi0;x,y(Di,De) (62) needs a con-
strained non-linear optimization and it is therefore rather hard
and time-consuming task.
B. Performance
We first show key generation rates of our protocol with re-
spect to the transmission distance. Figure 2 shows the optimal
key generation rates per pulse sent by Alice when the code
length N equals to 1.0× 104, 1.0× 105, and 1.0× 106, keeping
the average of Eve’s information less than 2−9. For compar-
ison, the asymptotic rate is also added, which is calculated
from the asymptotic rate formula with three different inten-
sities including vacuum [22]. Our decoy state QKD enables
Alice and Bob to share the final secret key securely up to 150
(km) while the secure secret key can be shared up to 250 (km)
in the asymptotic case. Although there is a huge gap between
the maximum transmission distances of the finite and asymp-
totic case, such small key generation rate with the finite code
length, in other words the large number of sacrifice bits, is
needed for keeping the average of Eve’s information less than
2−9 incorporating the statistical fluctuations. The main reason
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FIG. 2: Performance of our decoy state QKD. The secure secret key
can be shared up to 150 km when N = 1.0 × 106.
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FIG. 3: Optimal intensities with N = 1.0 × 106 and the asymptotic
case corresponding to the key generation rates in Figure 2.
why the more key generation rate is obtained with larger code
size is that Eve’s information can be estimated better with
large size statistics, such that the larger number of sampling
given by the check bits can be used for estimation as well as
the finite error correcting coding rate in Figure 1.
We then show the optimal intensities corresponding to the
rates in Figure 2. The three optimal different intensities µi
with N = 1.0×106 as well as the signal intensity in the asymp-
totic case are shown in Figure 3. The optimal signal intensities
decrease as the transmission distance is longer. This tendency
is easy to understood because the probability that the multi-
photon is emitted cannot be negligible for estimation of the
quantum channel at the long transmission distance. At the
maximum transmission distance 150 (km), The optimal inten-
sity µ3 becomes 0.15 which is the minimum value of the signal
intensity available for our numerical simulation because inten-
sities µi take discrete values by 0.05 and 0 < µ1 < µ2 < µ3.
It is quite smaller than the intensity 0.3 of the asymptotic case
at the maximal transmission distance 250 (km). This is be-
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FIG. 4: Key generation rates with respect to the security parameter δ
when the code length N = 104, 105, and 106.
cause considering statistical fluctuations including estimation
errors causes the worse estimations of mi0;x,y(Di,De) and such
random variables as J than the true values without estimation
errors. It turns out that the probability that the multi-photon is
sent including statistical fluctuations becomes more dominant
factor in our protocol.
We finally examine the performance of our protocol with
respect to the security parameter δ. Figure 4 shows the key
generation rates at the transmission distance 20 (km). The
rates when N = 1.0×106 hardly decrease at all while the rates
when N = 1.0 × 104 and 1.0 × 105 become smaller as δ is
bigger. This is because the larger number of sampling when
N is large enough makes the variance vi0;x,y in Eq (62) smaller.
Therefore the size of sacrifice bits mi0;x,y(Di,De) is affected
little by δ1, that is δ, and the final secret key can be shared as
securely as you want when N = 1.0 × 106.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
In conclusion, we have derived a formula for the size the
final secret key in the finite code length decoy state QKD with
arbitrary number of decoy states of different intensities incor-
porating the finite statistics [32].
We have utilized the central limit theorem and thereby ne-
glected the higher-order terms in the formula obtained here.
Furthermore, there is room to improve the derivation of the
size of privacy amplification. These points will be further
pursued in the future. Finally, we have assumed that the er-
ror probability of the signal generation at the sending port is
unknown. If this is not the case, the generation rate of the
final secret key would be improved [33]. Such an improve-
ment of arguments in Sec. VI would be also one of the future
problems.
APPENDIX A: CHOICE OF PARAMETER a
In Sec. VI we have used ha(x) instead of h(x) to circumvent
the singularity of h(x) when x → 0. If x is so close to 0 that
h′a(x) ≫ ha(x), the leading term of ∆Θ1 is well approximated
by
h′a(rˆ1x,y)
(
∆′G1i0+k −
N
ECi0+k
q1B1i0+k∆rˆ
1
x,y
)
.
Hence, denoting the variance of
∆′G1i0+k −
N
ECi0+k
q1B1i0+k∆rˆ
1
x,y
by V , we have
mi0;x,y(Di,De)
 N −
NAi0+k(qˆ1xP1i0+k + pD)
Ci0+k
+ h′a(rˆ1x,y)
√
VΦ−1(2−δ1 )
+
Nqˆ1x
Ci0+k
√
Ai0+kP1i0+k(1 − P1i0+k)Φ
−1(2−δ2)
+ha(rˆ1x,y)
Nqˆ1x
Ci0+k
[
Ai0+kP1i0+k
−
√
Ai0+kP1i0+k(1 − P1i0+k)Φ
−1(2−δ2)
]
+ δ3. (A1)
Our task is to choose the parameter a that minimizes
mi0;x,y(Di,De); the problem is reduced to the minimization of
f (a) = ha(rˆ1x,y)S + h
′
a(rˆ1x,y)T with respect to a, where
f ′(a) =

(S (r − a) + T )h′′(a) rˆ1x,y ≥ a,
0 rˆ1x,y < a,
(A2)
S :=
Nqˆ1x
Ci0+k
[
Ai0+kP
1
i0+k −
√
Ai0+kP1i0+k(1 − P1i0+k)Φ
−1(2−δ1)
]
,
(A3)
and
T :=
√
VΦ−1(2−δ2). (A4)
Since h′′(a) ≤ 0, the minimal f (a) is achieved when a =
rˆ1x,y + T/S . The values of S and T are actually unknown and
vary from time to time. However, if we can expect almost con-
stant values for S and T , which can be measured in advance,
a favorable choice of a is a = rˆ1x,y + T/S .
APPENDIX B: COMPUTATION OF SACRIFICE KEY SIZE
(FORWARD CASE)
To compute the size of sacrifice bits in the case of for-
ward error correction, we firstly change the definitions of ran-
dom variables in Sec. III since J3 in Eq. (10) cannot be ex-
pressed in terms of them with their original definitions. Ma-
jor alteration concerns the definition of the subscript j: For
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j = 0, 2, . . . , 2k + 1, q j are changed to represent the detection
ratio including the detector dark counts and q−1 is changed
to stand for the dark count ratio given that the emitted state
is a single photon state (q1 is left unchanged). Namely, for
j = 0, 2, . . . , 2k + 1, C ji now denote the numbers of pulses
detected normally as well as by dark counts given that the
emitted state is ρ j and C−1i now stands for the number of dark
counts given that the emitted state is ρ1. Alongside the mean-
ing of r j is changed for j = 2, . . . , k + 1. According to these
alterations, the definition of random variables E ji , F
j
i , G
j
i , and
Hi are also subject to modification. Almost all of equations
in Sec. IV and Sec. V are left unchanged except that (i) pD
should read pDP1i . (ii) the range of q j ( j = 2, . . . , 2k) should
be changed to 0 ≤ q j ≤ 1. (iii) the range of x should be
changed to [1,
√
2]. and (iv) Eqs. (22), (24), and (25) should
read, respectively,
qˆ jx =

p0 j = 0
ξ j j = 1, . . . , k, k + 2, . . . , 2k
1√
2
(
x + ξk+1
)
j = k + 1
1√
2
(
x − ξk+1
)
j = 2k + 1,
(B1)
ζ j :=
1
qˆ jx
k∑
i=1
(P−1k×k)ij
×
[
si pi −
1
2
(P0i p0 + P1i PD) − Pk+1i qˆk+1x y
]
, (B2)
and
ξ j :=
2k∑
i=1
(P−12k×2k)ij
(
pi − P0i p0 − P
1
i pD − xP
2k+1
i
)
. (B3)
The upper bound for the average phase error is now given
by
2
−
m−N+F1i0+k
1−h
G
1
i0+k
F1i0+k

+F0i0+k

+ ,
Here, we use
N − NAi0+k
Ci0+k
{
qˆ1xP
1
i0+k
[
1 − ha(rˆ1x,y)
]
+
C0
A0
}
as the estimation of
N − F1i0+k
1 − h
G
1
i0+k
F1i0+k

 − F0i0+k.
The subsequent argument is parallel to that in Sec. VI.
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